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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to e'xamine the relation 
.petween partisanship and roll call voting in_the 57th ses~ 
".... " ~ 
sion of the Oregon Legislature. Many of the conclusions 

and findings relate to what could be called the ~rfolk 

\1isdom" of Oregon politics. It is nothing new or profound, 

for example, to say that urban Republican legislators tend 

to 'vote with Democratic legislators, or that rural Demo­

cratic legislators tend to vote with Republicans. It is, 

however, useful to be able to state the above relationships· 

in quantified terms which confirm or deny that "folk wisdomn. 

An examination of these relationships should also shed light 

·on th~ nature of the legislative process in Oregon. 
Three fundamental changes occurred between the 56th 
and 57th sessions of the Oregon Legislatu~e.· First, the 
Oregon Senate came under Democratic control for the first 
time in its .history.. It· had previously been under the con­
trol of either the Republicans or a coalition of Republicans 
and conservative Democrats. 1 Second, the Oregon House of 
.Representatives came under Democratic control for the first 
time since 1961. Finally, all members.of the 57th session 
were elected from single member districts. Urban legis­
lators had previously been elected at large •. 
1 Although the word "conservative lt is an ambiguous 
. ter.m, it is probably the one most descriptive and available 
to describe those particular individuals. 
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The effects of these three change~ will be examined 
"throughout this paper in relation to partisan voting pat­
terns of both the parties as wholes and the individual 
legislators. 
Analysis of Roll Call Voting 
liThe recorded'decisions of legislative bodies pro'vide 
valuable information about the political systems at large 
in which they function. u2 This.statement by Duncan MacRae 
is an apt and succinct rationale for the study of roll call. 
voting. Such studies do, by their very nature, contribute 
information about b~e political system as a whole. The 
study of a specific organ of the body gives information on" 
the nature of the body itself. The specific or~an in this 
study is one of the fifty state legislatures, a small organ 
in an infinitely complex body, the body politic. 
Conclusions reached by analysis of roll call voting 
must be tempered with a knowledge of the legislative pro­
cess, however. In the Oregon Legislature, work performed 
in. committee is a major part of the process. An~lysis o~ 
roll call voting is not a methodological panacea for all 
possible questions. 
Much of the interaction which takes place during the 
legisla~ive process is unmeasurable by present methods of 
quantification. The decisions reached by a legislative 
2 Duncan MqcRae, Issues and Parties in Legislative 
Voting (New York: Harper and ROW, 1970), p. 1. 
3 
body are the result of a complex process of interaction 
containing elements of which we ,are only partially aware. 
One element which we are aware of is partisanship. Speci­
fically, partisanship is anyone legislator's attitude or 
disposition toward the party to which he or she belongs. 
Restated, it is the legislator's perc~ption of party mem­
bership. Every Oregon legislator claims to belong t9 a 
political party and every legislator has some conception of 
what that 'entails. For some, it is mere registration unde~ 
a label; for others, it is an active, compelling duty. 
This is literally the spectrum of possibilities as far as 
partisanship ~s concerned. 
The roll call. votes held in a legislativ~ body ca~ 
be viewed as a constant series' of questions being answered 
by the legislators. 3 Each vote requires a response from 
the legislator. The "yes" or "no" vote (and also an absent 
vote, in Oregon) is an answer ~o the question asked. The 
questions or votes can be seen as highly relevant indica­
tors of the political attitudes held.bY those individuals. 
Again, partisanship is one of those attitudes. While 
these indices are not the actual attitude, they are both a· 
measure of it and, because they are derived from actual 
votes, a direct manifestation of it. In another sense, the 
3 John G. Grumm, uA Fa~tor Analysis of Legislative 
Behavior," Midwest Journal of Po~itical Science, No. 7 
(november, 1963), p. 336. 
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roll call vote can be seen as almost a real-life opera­
.tional definition of partisanship. The main purpose in the 
present study is to use these indices in a comparison of 
groups which verifies or refutes popular hypotheses about 
Oregon politics. in reference to partisanship. 
Four major studies stand out in the field of roll call 
votinc;J analysis; Lawrence Lowell's liThe Influence of Party 
Upon Legislation in England and America," Julius Turner's 
Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, David Truman's 
The Congressional Party, and Duncan MacRae's Dimensions of 
Congressional Voting. 
Lawrence Lowell's 1901·work, "The Influence of Party 
.Upon Legislation in England and America,u4 was a landmark 
event in the study of legislative behavior. His. was the 
first major. study of roll call voting. Lowell only exam­
ined those roll call votes during wh~ch 90% of the party 
memberships were on opposing sides. This, for a period, 
became the standard definition of a "party vote." 
Lowell found that parties in America had comparatively 

little effect on legislation when contrasted with parties 

in Great Britain. He also found that the amount of part~ 

voting varied from session to session. Lowell found no 

apparent reason for this variation. 

4 Lawrence A. Lowell, liThe Influence of Party Upon 

Legislation in England and America," Annual Report of the 

American Historical Association (1901), p. 323. 

5 
Although innovative in this work, Lowell did not choose 
; 
to examine those party votes he discovered. He did not con­
trol for factors other than party, such as geographical 

region or constituency characteristics. He also did not 

identify any factors which might help explain why particular 

legislators deviat~d from their parties on party votes. 

In 1951, Julius Turner published his Party and Consti­
tuency: Pressures on Congress. Turner used Lowell's 90% 

definition of a party vote and found that between 1921 and 

1948, only 17% of the roll call votes in the U. S. House 

of Representatives met this criterion. Turner"did conclude, 

however, that party was the most clearly discernible factor 
in explaining ,..,hy votes were cast. He reached this conclu­
sion because he found that party made a significant difference 
in 90% of the votes he examined. Because of this difference 
Turner also concluded that American political parties were 
much more responsible than many people had supposed them 
to be. 5 
In a later revised edition of Turner's work, the thresh­
. old level was lowered to 50%.6 This was done to include 
more data than found in the previous study. 
5 Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures On 
Congress (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 19.51), p.. 23. 
6 Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures On 
Congress, rev. ed., Edward Schneier, editor (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Press, 1970), cited in William Keefe and Morris Dgul's 
The Legislative Process (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1972), p. 301. . 
6 
Another major work in the analysis of roll call voting 
is The Congressional Party by ,David Truman. Truman's work 
was extensive and combined statistical analysis, of voting 
patterns with a discussion of the role of" legislative lead­
ership. Truman used a cluster-bloc analysis technique which 
measures the agreement of each legislator with every' other 
legislator. He,was able to identify certain blocs and he 
e::h"Plored the natures of those blocs. On dif,ferent issues, 
Truman found the parties split ~nto different blocs. For 
example, he found an East-West split in the Senate 'Democrats 
on international issues.? In reference to partisansh~p, 
Truman found that the Democrats were more cohesive, than the 
Republicans during the 31st Session of the U. S. Congress 
which he studied. 8 
From the standpoint of statistics and quantified data, 
Duncan MacRae's Dimensione of Congressional Voting is the 
outstanding work. Among other techniques, MacRae uses 
Guttman scaling. Guttman scaling is a cumulative technique 
which relates similar responses. Scales are constructed 
for both parties. These include a Fair Deal Scale and an 
Agriculture Scale. MacRae cross tabulates scores on the 
various scales with constituency characteristics. He finds 
7 David B. Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1959), p. 32. 
8 TrQman, p. 82. 
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that rural Democrats tend to be more conservative than urban 
Democrats on the. Fair Deal Scale, but he PQints out that 
Southern Democrats tend to be more conservative regardless 
of their constituencies. 9 Rural or farm Republicans) in 
addition, are more conservative than urban Rep'Uhlica~p. 1,0 
MacRae also did an analysis of roll call voting in the 
Massachusetts House of Representatives using factor anal­
ysis. 11 Republican representatives in Massachusetts 'tended 
to come from rural or suburban upper class areas. Democrats, 
on the other hand, tended to come from urban lower class 
areas. MacRae wanted to measure the relation of constituency 
to voting in those districts which had close elections. ' 
MacRae defined a "close" election as an instance in which 
the winner obtained less than 60% of the vote. He then' 
selected seven issues on which the par-l:ies found themselves 
in opposition. 
MacRae found the greatest amount of deviation (an indi­
vidual voting against the majority of his or her party) on 
the part of representatives elected from districts atypical 
of their own party and typical of the opposing party. ,In 
other words, deviant Democrats tended to come from Repub­
9 Duncan MacRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional 
Voting (Berkeley: University of Californ~a Press, 1958), 
p. 261 • 
10 MacRae, Dimensions, p. 263. 
11 Duncan MacRae, Jr., liThe Relation Between Roll Call 
Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Rep­
resentatives," American Political Science Review, No. 4 
(December, 1952), pp. 1046-1055. 
8 
12lican like districts and vice versa. MacRae observed 
.that the party regulars, those who deviated from the majo­
rity the least, came from districts with wide electoral 
margins. MacRae could be criticized for using only seven 
roll call votes. 
John Grumm also used factor analysis to examine roll 
call voting in a· state legislature. Grumm examined the 
Kansas legislature in 1957 and 1959, us'ing a 65% threshold 
level to define a party vote. He found 41 House issues 
and 57 Senate issues which had party votes. 13 Correlation 
matrices were constructed for each house; then coefficients 
were computed. Grumm found that the presence of a large 
number of Democratic voters or urban workers in a Republican 
senator's district tended to be correlated with that sena­
tor's voting with the Democrats. 14 Grumm also found a hi.gh 
correlation between the Democratic factors and the "liberal ". 
factors.1~ A liberal legislator, according to Grumm's 
definition, was one who was willing to vote for such things 
as social programs, welfare increases, and increases in 
saiaries for government employees. 
12 MacRae, "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and. 
Constituencies," p. 1051. 
13 Grumm, p. 341. 
14 Grumm, p. 347. 
15 Grumm, .p. 351 • 
9 
In addition to party being an important factor, Grumm 
found two other factors important in their effect on voting: 
whether a district was urban or rural, and whether a dis­
trict was growing or declining in population. 16 Grurom 
found that senators from growing areas t~nded to be conser­
vative, while senators from declining areas tended to be 
liberal. 17 
Most of the findings of these various studies are 
fairly consistent. Constituency and party influence are 
constant themes t.hroughout the literature of roll call 
voting analysis, and appropriately so. The important ques­
tion asked by examination of .party and constituency
I influences is, simply, "Who are the legislators representing?" 
I 
 Much of the time it is hard to. separate the two factors. 

Does a particular legislator vot~ a certain way because 
- he is a Democrat or because he is from an urban area? Most 
of what was discovered 1n the following study of the Oregon 
Legislature was consistent with earlier studies. It was 
decided to go beyond the factors of party and constituency 
into other areas which are perhaps of equal or even mo~e 
importance. This will be discussed in detail in the next. 
chapter. 
16 Grumm, p. 350. 
17 Grurom, p. 351 • 
CHAPTER II 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
PARTY VOTES 
Before the amount of partisanship can be measured, 
a definition of what constitutes a "party vote" has to be 
asserted. Lowell's use of 90% opposing majorities has,been 
mentioned. This was a very rigorous standard and tended 'to 
eliminate data. The eliminated data, of course, were the 
bills on which there were less than 90% opposing majorities 
or no opposing majorities at all. If Lo'\vell's 90% threshol-d 
is used, the only comparison which can be made between two 
parties would be from the 90% level to ~~e 100% level. This 
would obviously be inadequate. For this study, the standard 
of the Congressional Quarterly was used. 18 Any roll call 
vote which has the majorities ,(55% to insure whole vote divi­
sions) of the two parties on oPP9sing sides will be consi­
dered a party vote. 
The Oregon constitution requires an absolute majority 
'\ 
of those l,egislators elected to pass any measure. This 
18 "Party Unity Voting: Sharp,Decline in 1972 Session," 
Congressional Roll Call (Washington, D. C. Congressional 
Quarterly, Inc., 1973), p. 2122. 
Congressional Quarterly periodically reports on party 
voting in the U. S. Congress using the above mentioned method. 
In the 1972 Session c. Q. found that 36% of ~e roll call votes 
in the House and 27% of the roll'call votes in the Senate were 
party votes. In the House, the Democrats had an average par­
tisan score of 58% while the Republicans had an average score 
of 66%. The 'House Democrats won 52% of the party votes, with 
the Republicans winning the other 48%. In the Senate theDem­
ocrats had an average partisan score of 57%. The Republicans 
had an average of 66%. The Senate Democrats won 56% of the 
party votes, with the Senate Republicans winning, 44%. 
11 
,effectively means that excused or absent members cast "no" 
votes. In the collection of data, absent or excused votes 
were considered tlnon votes. There are no "tie" votes. A 
motion receiving an equal nm~er of yes and no votes fails; 
thus, the party voting unoll wins the motion. 
The study eventually included examination of approxi­
mately three thousand bills in both the 56th and 57th 
sessions. B9th third reading and procedural votes were 
considered. Procedural votes include such motions as, to 
table a bill or to refer a bill back to committee. Pro­
cedural questions are common points of partisan conflict. 
The respective party members ,are supposed to vote with their 
own parties on procedural votes. Third reading votes,'of 
course, are votes on final passage in a pa~ticul~r house. 
Once all party votes were identified, percentages of 
party cohesion were computed for the two parties in each 
house for the two sessions. These percentages are the mean 
proportion of the number of party members voting together 
on party votes--or restated in sim~ler terms, the average 
percentage of the party members voting together on par~y 
votes. These percentages are the indices of party cohesion. 
Cohesion is a measure of the partisanship of the party as' 
a whole. (The percentages alvlay.s exceed 50% because the 
definition of a party vote allows consideration of only 
those votes on which the majorities of the parties were.on 
opposing sides.) 
12 

Individual legislators were then assigned percentage 
indices of partisanship. These percentages are the propor­
tions of the times they each voted with the majorities of 
their respective p~rties on party votes. 19 
All three processes,'id~ntification of party votes, 
calculation of party cohesion indices, and calculation 
indices of individual partisanship, were done with an 
IBM 1130 computer. 
To reiterate an earlier point, the indices of parti­
sanship reported here are indicators of a particular poli­
tical attitude. The endeavor here is the comparison of 
groups and individuals in reference to that attitude. 
Areas of Inquiry 
There were six areas of inquiry for this study. 
- 1. The two major partie~. How did the partisanship­
compare? Which of the two parties was the more partisan 
during the periods of study? The folk wisdom of Oregon 
politics says that the Republicans in the legislature are 
the more partisan; does this hold true? 
19 Another popular index of cohesion is that of Stuart 
A. Rice. The Rice index of cohesion is the absolute differ­
ence between the percentage of those voting for an issue and 
those voting against an issue. For example, if 40%·of a' 
party voted "yes tt and 60% voted n~o" on an issue, the index 
of cohesion would be 20. The Rice index does not necessarily 
assume that the parties are opposed on the particular issues 
which are examined. The Congressional Quarterly method used 
in this study has the distinct advantage of being readily 
understandable to those not overly familiar with the quanti­
tative methods of social science. 
13 
2. Urban legislators. Do urban legislators differ 
from other legislators? What is the relation between par­
tisanship and election from an urban district? The folk 
wisdom has it that urban Republicans vote with the Democrats 
a substantial proportion of the time; is this true? 
3. Women legislators. More women are participating 
in politics. Do· women differ from other legislators as a 
whole? The folk wisdom is that women are more "liberal. 1I 
What can be said about this by looking at the partisanship 
of women legislators? 
4. Legislators under thi'r'ty. There were eleven legis­
lators under the age of thirty in the 57th session of the 
Oregon House. Young elected officials are usually thought 
to be more "liberal. 1f Is this reflected in their partisan­
ship? 
5 • Freshmen legis1a'to'rs. There were ,twenty-six 
freshmen legislators in the 57th session. These freshmen 
were an unknown quantity before the session. How partisan 
were the new members? 
6. Legislators representing single member' distri~ts. 
As mentioned earlier, there .was a basic change bet'l;,qeen the 
56th and 57th sessions in refer~nce to single member dis­
tricts. Some legislators who were elected from multimember 
districts in the 56th session were elected from single 
member districts in the 57th session. It was the popula~ 
belief that these individuals would be influenced by this 
change. Was there a change in partisanship for these people? 
14 

Three of these areas of inquiry are variations upon 
the earlier mentioned theme of constituency and party influ­
ence: the major parties themselves; urban districts, and 
election from single member districts. The other areas of 
inquiry, such as women, youth and freshman status, are not 
constituency related factors. (In Oregon there is, however, 
a high correlation between being a woman legislator and 
being from an urban district.) It is probably due to the 
lack of obvious constituency relation that these factors 
were not examined by the previous ~tudies. As mentioned 
previously, they are elements in the Oregon legislative 
process and should merit consideration. 
If'the nonconstituency related factors prove to be 
" 
~ignificantly related to partisanship, this would, to an 
extent, confirm the complex nature of the legislative 
process. 
The 56th session was examined first to serve as a 
basis of comparison in several of these areas. The parti­
sanship of the two parties under different leadership 
situations and the partisanship of legislators'electe~ from 
single member districts were the factors which necessitated 
this. The other subgroups--urban legislators, women legis­
lators, young legislators and freshmen legislato~s--were 
examined for the 57th session only. 
CHA)?TER III 
THE 56TH SESSION 
General Description of the Session 
Several major innovative pieces of legislation were 
passed by the 56th Session of the Oregon Legislature. 
These included, among others: 
SB 40 Completely revised the criminal code. 
SB 683 Created the Children's Services Division. 
HB ,1036 '- Outla'\.ved no deposit bottles: the "Bottle 
Bill." 
HB 1054 - Allo\ved for consolidation of the City' of 
Portland and Multnomah County. 
HB 1059 - Created the State Department of Human 
Resources. 
HB 1639 - Gave limited property tax relief to low 
income home owners. 
HB 3037 - Expanded consumer protection l'aws. 
On~y two of these major bills underwent party votes. 
HB 1054, City-County consolidation for Portland and Multno­
mah County, underwent a party vote on a procedural question 
in the Sena-te. The minority report was defeated by the 
Democrats, 17 -to 13. In the House, HB 1639, the bill for 
property tax relief, also underwent a party vote on a pro­
cedural question. The minority report was defeated by the' 
the Republicans, 33 to 26. 
16 
Although only two of these major pills were subject 
to party votes on the floor of the Senate, they could have 
been partisan issues before they got to the floor. Roll 
call voting is only one part of the legislative process. 
Many controversial measures are amended in committee to the 
extent that they cease to be partisan. 
The Senate 
As stated earlier, the Oregon Senate was controlled by 
a coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats during 
the 56th session (1971). The Senate went through a twelve, 
day deadlock in trying to elect a president. The Democrats 
had a sixteen to fifteen majority, but Senator E. D. Potts, 
'D-Grants Pass, refused to vote with his partY"thus ca~sing 
a fifteen to fifteen tie. On the fifty-fourth ballot, 
Senator John Burns, D-Portland, defected and gave notice 
that he would vote for himself for Senate president. Burns 
had previously voted for the ,regular Democratic nominee, 
Senator Berkeley 'Lent, of Portland. Potts and the fourteen 
Republicans also voted for Burns, thus bringing, the Senate 
under coalition control. 20 
This coalition can be seen in the difference between 
the indices of cohesion of the 56th session as set forth in 
Table I. Democratic cohesion was 72% while Republican cohe-, 
sion was 80%. The Democrats won only 38% of the party 
-20 Harry Bodine, nSenate Chooses John Burns as Presi­

dent, II The Oregonian, 23 Jan. 1971, p. 1, cols. 1-2. 
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vdtes, whereas the Republicans won 62% of the party votes. 
IThere is an obvious relation between cohesion, size of a 
party's majority or minority 'and the number of party votes 
won. A minority party which is only ~lightly in .the ~nor­
ity and is very cohesive can dominate a majority party 
which is less cohesive. If a minority party is. substan­
tially in the minority, increased cohesiveness will not 
result in as many victories. 
TABLE I 
COMPARISON OF PARTY COHESION FOR THE 

DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES 

IN THE 56TH SESSION OF 

THE OREGON SENATE 
% Cohesion % of Roll Call Votes Won 
(Party Votes) 
Democrats 72 38 
Republ.icans 80 62 
Number of Party Votes - 93 Number of Democratic 

Members - 16 

Actual Number of Bills - 86 Number of Republican 

Members - 14 

(Significant as a sample to the 5% level)21 
was measured by use of a "tn test': 
N1-Subjects in sample i1 N2-Subjects in sample·#2 X1-Mean of sample #1 . 
,X2-Mean of sample ,#2 S1-Std. deviation sample #1 
S2~Std. deviation sample #2 
This test essentially asks, "What is the probability of dif-' 
ference between the means being significant 95 times out of 
100 given the size of the sample?" For a specific discu.ssion 
see: Hubert M. Blalock, Jr.; Social Statistics (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 226. 
18 

The term "significance, n which is. used both in the 
text and in the tables, should be explained. Significance 
refers to the difference between the two means which are 
being compared. At first glance the eight percent differ­
ence in the above table may seem small, but this is deceptive. 
These means are the actual population behavior,. not samples 
of population behavior, and the difference between them can­
not be ignored, regardless of the size4 Statistical'sig­
nificance.is a moot point in this sense. Significance is 
reported, however, treating the populations as if they were 
samples. 'This is done only as an aid in making any gener­
alizations from the examined populations to larger' populations. 
The lack of cohesion on the part of the Democrats, 
. . 
mentioned above and shown in the Table I, is the. direct re­
suIt of the voting patterns of Senators Potts, Burns, ~nd 
- the original founder of the coalition, Harry Boivin, of 
Klamath Falls. Their individual partisan indices will .be 
given in Table II. If the scores of Potts, Burns and Boivin 
are excluded, the Democrats would have had an index of cohe­
sion of 80%. 
One of the most interesting points determined was that 
relatively' fe'ti of the bills give~ consideration undenvent 
party votes. Of the 375 bills voted on by the Senate, only 
23% were subject to party votes on either procedural ques­
tions or third readings. As mentioned earlier, partisan 
1-9 
conflict is manifested in many areas other thari roll call 
voting; hence~ the 23% figure is perhaps deceptive. 
Table II gives the partisan scores of each individual 
senator. The Democrats had scores ranging from 13% for Sen­
ator Potts to 92%·for Senator Burbidge, with a 72% average. 
The Republican partisan scores ranged from 55% for Senator 
Wingard to 91% "for Senator Raymond. The median for the 
Democrats was 76%, while the median for the Republicans was 
84%. The, median is that score which falls in the middle if 
all the scores are arranged in magnitude. Potts, Burns and 
Boivin, all Democrats, voted with the Republicans more than 
with their own party. As mentioned earlier, this resulted 
in the Democrats winning only 38% of the party votes. 
TABLE II 
INDIVIDUAL INDICES OF PARTISANSHIP FOR SENATORS 
IN THE 56TH SESSION. PERCENTAGE EACH 
LEGISLATOR VOTED WITH HIS OR HER" 
OWN PARTY ON PARTY VOTES 
Democrats 
, 
Bain 
Boe 
86% 
66% 
Groener 
Haas-Lent22 
72% 
91% 
Boivin 47% Hallock 87% 
, Browne 84% Holstrom 69% 
Burbidge 92% Mahoney 68% 
22 Senator Berkeley Lent, D-Portland, resigned on 
May 1, 1971, to accept a judgeship: He was replaced by 
Representative Harl Haas, D-Portland. Haas resigned his 
House seat to assume the Senate seat. He was replaced by 
Representative Kei~~ Burns, D-Portland. Both the sco~es of 
Haas and Lent in the Senate and of Haas and Burns in the 
House are reported for convenience. ~ihile they should not 
be cited as the voting pattern of anyone of the individuals, 
they are two examples of Democratic partisanship. 
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Burns H. 48% Potts 13% 

. Cook 84% Roberts B. 82% 

_Fadeley 80% Wilner 86% 

mean - 72% 

median - 76% 

ReEublicans 
Atiyeh 87% MacPherson 80% 
Carson 70% Mackay 86% 
Dement 84% Newhry 83% 
Eivers 76% Ouderkirk 84% 
Hartung 70% Raymond 91% 
Hoyt 76% Wingard 55% 
Jernstedt 84% yturri 88% 
mean - 80% 

median - 84% 

Figure 1 is a graph placing the Democratic senators in 
rank order rela~ionship. The diagonal line running across 
the graph divides the legislators into two groups, those who 
voted with their party more than against their party and 
vice versa. The individual partisan scores are also given 
at the bottom of the graph. The graph illustrates the rel­
ative extent of cohesion among the senators. As can be seen 
from the graph, three senators--Burns, Boivin and Potts-­
are in the lower category, which means they voted against 
their party more than with their party. This further illus­
trates the problem of the losing Democratic majority. 
Figure 2 places the Republicans in the same relationship. 
Only Senator Wingard stands out. Wingard did, however, 
vote with his party a majority of the time in the 56th 
session. 
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The House 
The Republicans controlled the House of Representa­
tives in the 56th Session by a majority of 34 to 26. The 
Speaker was Republican Robert Smith of Burns, Oregon. The 
indices of cohesion are given in Table III. The Democrats 
had an 84% index of party cohesion and won 34% of the 
party votes. The Republicans had a 77% index of cohesion 
and won 66% of the party votes. Although the Democrats 
were more .cohesive than the Republicans, this could not 
make up for the eight vote majority held by the Republicans. 
TABLE III 
COMPAR~SON OF COHESION FOR THE DEMOCRATIC AND 

REPUBLICAN PARTIES IN THE 56TH SESSION 

OF THE OREGON HOUSE OF REPP~SENTATIVES 

% Cohesion % of Roil Call Votes Won 
(Party Vo-ces) 
.- Democrats 84 34 
Republicans 77 66 
Number of Party Votes - 96 Number of ~emocratic 
Members 26 
Number of Actual Bills 93 Number of Republican 
Members - 34 
(Significant as a sample to 5% level.) 
Again, only a relatively small number of bills con­
sidered were subject to party votes. In the 56th Session 
this amounted to only about 10% of the 622 bills voted on 
in the House. Of the bills on which party votes occurred, 
a high 'proportion (approximately 25%) had to do with 
24 
elections, reapportionment and other gqvernmental affairs. 
This is hardly an unusual area for partisan conflict to 
occur. As noted earlier, the small number of bills is 
deceptive. The figure should not be considered as a par­
ticular index of partisan conflict for the whole legis­
l'ative process • 
,On an individual basis the Democrats ranged in par­
tisanship from a lo\v of 51% for Representative Magruder 
to 98% fO,r Representative Frank Roberts. As mentioned 
earlier, the overall average for Democrats was 84%. The 
Republicans ranged from 41% for Representative Elliot,to 
93% for Representative Meeker. The Republican average 
was 77%.' The Republicans had a greater range than the 
Democrats: 52% versus 47%. The Democratic medi.an was 
84.5% and the Repu)lican median was 78%. 
None of the Democrats voted with the opposing party 
more than with their own party in the 56th Session. Three 
Republican Representatives did vote with the Democrats 
more than· 'V'7ith their O"<:'ln party: Representatives Elliot, 
Graham, and Stathos·. 
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TABLE IV 
INDIVIDUAL INDICES OF PARTISANSHIP FOR REPRESENTATIVES 
IN THE 56TH SESSION. PERCENTAGE EACH 
LEGISLATOR VOTED WITH HIS OR HER 
PARTY ON PARTY VOTES 
Democrats 
Akeson 86% Fadeley N. 95% OWens 91% 
AuCoin 81% Haas-Burns 95% Peck '80% 
Byers 82% Heard 81 %. Perry 96% 
Cherry 86% Hollingsworth 73% Ripper 83% 
Cole' 70% Howard 77% Roberts F. 98% 
Craig 95% Kennedy 82% Skelton 89% 
Densmore 90% Lang 67% Stevenson 84% 
Eymann 97% t-1agruder 51% Willits 85% 
Maher 91% Wolfer M. 67% 
mean - 84% 

median 84.5% 

ReEublicans 
Anunsen 78% Ingalls 67% Patterson 92% 
Bazett 92% Johnson L. 89% Paulus 7.1 % 
Chuinard 84% Johnson S. 83% Pynn 88% 
Collett 76% Kinsey 64% Rieke 61% 
Crothers 76% MacPherson 78% Smith 9.0% 
Elliot 41% J'.lann 74% Stathos 40% 
- Graham 42% r.farkham 90% Stults R .. 84% 

Gwinn 67% Martin 83% Thornton 78% 

Hanneman 78% McGilvra 75% Walden 92% 

Hansell' 85% McKensie .75% Young 92% 

Henderson 78% Heeker 93% 

Howe 86% Nyberg 85% 

mean - 77 

median - 78 

Figure 3 places the Democratic representatives in 
rank order relationship. All the Democrats voted with 
their party more than with the Republican party. Figure 4 
shows the rank ordering of the Republicans. Three Repub­
licans stand out, Graham at 42%,- Elliot at 41% and Stathos 
at 4.0%. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE 57TH SESSION 
General Description of the SessionI The 57th Session of the Oregon Legislature, in 1973,l 
was. the longest in tpe state's history, lasting one hun­1 
I dred and eighty days. More pills were introduced than 
I ever before, a total of two thousand, five hundred. Among 
j significant pieces of legislation passed by both of the 
I 
J Democratically controlled'houses were:' 
\. 
SB 100 - This was the land use planning bill, which 
established a statewide Land'Conservation and Development 
Commission. Its purpose waS to control urban sprawl and 
excessive development of Oregon's scenic areas. 
- SB 1'87 - This bill increased workman's compensation 
to-·80% of the individual's normal weekly salary. This was 
'a major victory for labor. 
HB 2004 - This was the ill-fated tax plan of Governor 
McCall's. The measure increased personal and corporate 
income taxes and had the state, paying 90% of the basic 
school support. It also removed the property tax on homes. 
The measure was defeated in a May 1st referendum. Al­
though the legislature passed a second series of measures 
for school support and property tax relief, these were not 
nearly as extensive as the original plan. 
HB 3077 - This was a limit on campaign spending. 
. ,Those running for statewide office 'tllTould be limited to 
29 
fifteen cents per registered voter per election.. Those 
running for legislativ~ ~ffice would be limited to twenty-
five cents per registered voter per election. 
SB 100 was subject to one party vote in ehe House. 
It was a procedural motion to refer the bill back to corn­
mittee. The Rep~blican~ lost~ 25 to 34. 
HB 2004 was subject to party votes in both the House 
and the Senate. In the House there was one par~y vote. 
The minority report was reje~te~, with the Democrats winni~g 
23 to 36. In the Senate'the bill was subjected to six 
party votes. The Republicans won a procedur~l vote to 
rej ect the coromittee report, 13 to 17. They. lost the four 
other procedural votes and the final third reading. 
In addition to the length and volume of legislation 
cons-idered, the session was notable for the va,st amount of 
public' participation in both regular hearings and lobbyi~g 
activities. 
The Senate 
The Senate came under regular Democratic control for ~ 
the first time in this century during the 57th Session. The 
Democrats held an 18 to 12 majority, and all Democratic 
members voted for the Democratic n9m~nee for Senate president, 
Senator Jason Boe, D-Reedsport. 
Indices of cohesion are found in Table V. Democratic 
cQhesion increased slightly from the 72% of the 56th ses­
s'ion to 76% for the 57th session. The Democrats also won 
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70% of the party roll call votes. Republican cohesion 
decreased from 80% for the 56th session to 76% for the 
57th session. The Republicans won only 30% of the party 
roll call votes. Increased Democratic cohesion, combined. 
with a decrease in Republi?an cohesion and an increased 
Democratic majority (18 instead of' 16, as in the 56th ses­
sion) enabled the Democrats to win 70% of the party votes. 
After being in a numerical majority for several-years, the 
regular Dem~crats had gained control. 
TABLE V 
CO~~ARISON OF PARTY COHESION FOR THE 
DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES 
FOR THE 57TH SESSION OF THE 
OHEGON SENATE 
'% Cohesion % of Roll Call Votes Won 
(Party Votes) 
Democrats 74 70 
Republicans 76 ' 30 
Number of Party Votes - 117 Number of Democratic 
Senators 18 
Number of Actual Bills - 78 ',Number of Republican 
Senators 
- 12 
(Difference in means not significant as a sample.) 
Individual indices of partisanship for the Democrats 
ranged from 39% for Senator Thorne to 91% for Senator 
William Stevens,on. The average "index of partisanship for 
the Democrats was 74%. The Republicans ra~ged from 47% 
for Senator Wingard to 86% for Senator Atiyeh, with an 
average of 76%. 't"lingard also had the lo'\vest Republican 
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partisan score in the 56th session. Wingard is elected 
from a heavily Democratic district in Eugene. The median 
for the Democrats was 79%, while the median for the Repub­
licans was 74%. 
·TABLE VI 
INDIVIDUAL INDICES OF PARTISANSHIP FOR SENATORS 

IN THE 57TH SESSION. PERCENTAGE EACH 

LEGISLATOR VOTED WITH HIS OR HER 

PARTY ON PARTY VOTES 

Democrats 
Boe 79% Heard 58% 
Browne 82% Holstrom 65% 
Burbridge 90% Howard 80% 
Burns J. 53% Mahoney 67% 
Cook 80% Ripper 77% 
Fadeley E. 79% Roberts B. 85%. 
Groener 83% Stevenson w. 91% 
Hallock 84% Thorne 39% 
ReEublicans 
Atiyeh . 86% MacPherson 74% 
Carson 70% Meeker 87% 
Eivers 74% Newbry 76% 
Hartung 73% Ouderkirk 83% 
Hoyt 65% Smith 94% 
Jernstedt 81% Wingard 47% 
A particularly interesting aspect is the change in 
the partisanship of Senator Potts. Potts went from a par­
tisan Score of 13% in the 56th Session to a 52% partisan 
score in the 57th Session. Whether this was due to change 
of heart or political expediency is up to conjecture. 
Senator John Burns, the previous coalition Senate 
president, improved only slightly, from 48% in the 56th 
I 
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Session to 53% in the 57th Session. Both Potts and Burns 
were the Democratic members of the coalition in the 56th 
Session. 
The Democrats also had trouble holding two of their 
new senators. Fred Heard, from Klamath Falls, had a par­
tisan score of 58%. Heard ,assumed the s€nate seat previ­
ously held by the coalition founder, Harry Boivin •. Mike 
Thorne from Eastern Oregon had a partisan score of only 
39%. 
Figure 5 places the Democratic senators in rank order 
relationship. Again the most evident deviation is on the 
part of Senator Thorne. Figure 6 places the Republicans in 
rank order relationship. Senator Wingard again stands out 
at 47%. 
The House 
The House came under Democratic control for 'the first 
time in ten years. With a six vote majority, Representa­
tive Richard Eymann, D-Springfield, was elected Speaker. 
The Democrats' cohesiveness cropped from 84% in the 56th 
Session to 72% in the 57th Session. Republican cohesive­
ness dropped from 77% in the 56th Session to 75% in the 
57th Session. The Democrats won 57% of the party votes 
and the Republicans won 43% of the party votes. Their in­
dices are set forth in Table VII. 
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TABLE VII 
COMPARISON OF PARTY COHESION FOR THE DEMOCRATIC 

AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES IN THE 57TH SESSION. 

OF THE OREGON HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

% Cohesion % of Roll Call Votes Won 
(Party Votes) 
Democrats 72 57 
Republicans 75 43 
Number of Party Votes - 182 Number of Democratic 
Representatives 33 
Number of Actual Bills - - 78 Number of Republican 
Representatives - 27 
(Difference of means not significant as a sample.) 
Although there were a greater number-of party votes 
for the House in the 57th'Session, the actual percentage 
of the.total bills considered remained·small. Of the. 
994 bills considered by the House, party votes occurred 
on only about eight percent. 
While the Democrats controlled the House, they did 
not dominate the party voting as did the Democrats in. the 
Senate. ~lliereas in the Senate the Democrats won 70%.0£ 
the party votes, in the House they won only 57%. Although 
the Senate Democrats had a greater proportional 'majority, 
the House Democrats should probably have won more of the 
party votes. In the 56th Session the Republicans won 
66% of the roll call votes with an eight member majority, 
even though the Democrats were 7% more cohesive. In the 
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57th Session the Democrats had a six vote majority and were 
only 3% less cohesive than the Republicans; yet they won 
only 57% of the party votes. 
The 12% drop in Democratic cohesiveness between' the" 
56th and 57th Sessions (84% to 72%) was 'due mainly to the 
decreased partisanship on the part of several returning 
Democrats and-the lower partisanship on the part of several" 
newly elected Democrats. Individual "partisan scores for 
the Democrats ranged from 12% .for Representative Magruder 
to 95% for Representative Nancie Fadeley. The average, as 
previously mentioned, was 72%. The median score for the 
Democrats was 80.5%. In addition to Magruder" the Demo­
,cratic majority had,trouble wi~~ several of its other mem­
bers.. ,Thes~. ~ncluded Repres~ntatives G;i.lrnour, with a score 
,of-19%; Sumner, with a score of 48%; Curt Wolfer, with a', 
score of 35%; and Martin Wolfer, with a score of 45%. All 
of these individuals voted with the Republicans more than 
half the time on party votes. These five votes 'reduced the 
Democratic majority to a minority on several occasions. " 
All five were from rural areas~ 
Individual Republican indices of partisanship ranged 
from 37% for Representative Rieke to 90% for Representative 
Patterson, with an average of 75%. In addition to Rieke, 
Representative Kinsey, with a partisan score of 49%, also 
voted with the Democrats more than half the time. Although 
both parties had defections, the Democratic defections 
1- ," • 
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were greater and more numerous. Common characteristics of 
representatives and senators with low partisan scores wi~l 
be discussed later. The median score for Republicans was 
84%. Individual indices for both Democrats and Republi­
cans are found in Table VIII. 
TABLE VIII 
INDIVIDUAL INDICES OF PARTISANSHIP FOR REPRESENTATIVES 
IN THE 57TH SESSION. PERCENTAGE EACH 
LEGISLATOR VOTED WITH HIS OR HER 
PARTY ON PARTY VOTES 
Democrats 
Akeson 75% Magruder 12% 
AuCoin 91% Marx 80~ 
Blumenauer 81% McCoy 93% 
Byers 55% Otto 63% 
Cherry 69% Peck 67% 
Cole 62% perry 81% 
Densmore 87% Priestley 78% 
Derell 81% Roberts M. 86% 
Eymann 87% Skelton 67% 
Fadeley N. 95% Stevenson 76% 
Gilmour 19% Sumner 48% 
Granell 85% Whallon 65% 
Groener 83% Whiting 93% 
Kafoury 88% Willits 88% 
Katz 85% Wolfer C. 35% 
Lang 78% Wolfer M. 45% 
Lindquist 88% 
mean - 72% 
median - 80.5% 
Republicans 
Bazett 89% Markhari 89% 
Bunn 79% Martin 79% 
Burrows 54% Morris 86% 
Elliot 50% Oakes 84% 
Gwinn 53% Patterson 90% 
Hampton 77% Paulus 56% 
HanneIJlan 84% Ragsdale 79% 
Hansell 74% Rieke 38% 
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Ingalls 
Johnson L. 
63% 
86% 
Stults D. 
Stults R. 
86% 
88% 
Johnson s. 77% vlalden 88% 
Jones 91% Whitehead 66% 
Kinsey 49% Wilhelms 85% 
MacPherson G. 89% 
mean - 75% 
median - 84% 
Figure 7 gives the Democratic representatives in 
rank order relationship. .As can be seen from the graph, 
there were four Democrats-who voted with the Republicans 
more than with their own party. This has been previously. 
mentioned. 
Figure 8 places the Republican representatives in 
rank order relationship. Kinsey at 49% and Rieke at 38% 
. stand out in relation to the other Republicans. 
At one time during the session there were rumors of 
~ possible coalition being formed bet~~een the Republicans 
and six of the Democrats. These latter included Gilmour, 
Magruder, Sumner,' C. Wolfer and M. Wolfer, who were men­
tioned previously in reference to their 10\" partisan scores. 
The sixth Democrat was Representative Harvey Akeson. All 
of the six had opposed the- original ~1cCal1 tax plan and 
had drafted a'letter to Speaker Eymann asking for a voice 
in the writing of the new tax plan. Eymann appointed 
Martin Wolfer to the special committee which eventually 
did write an alternative tax plan. No sooner had the six 
started to congratulate themselves on their success than 
EYma,nn struck back and removed Magruder, and Gilmour from 
88% 
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their positions as chairman and vice-chairman of the Consumer 
and Business Affairs Committee. Eymann said specifica~ly 
that he wanted to discourage any possibility of coalition 
politics in the House. The main barrier to a coalition . 
being formed, according to several sources, was the possi­
bility that several of the ur~an Republicans would not join 
23in the attempt. Both Representatives Hagruder and Gilmour 
pad·~een consistently voting with the Republican~ ·on pro­
cedural questions. As mentioned earlier, procedural ques­
tions are supposedly the only votes which require voting 
with the party leadership. This is an informal caucus 
agreement. 
Coalition po~itics is a fasci.nating subject. It has 
been a cons-tant element in Oregon since 1961 and the origi­
nal Senate coalition. Motivations for forming coalitions 
go beyond conservative/liberal attitudes .into the .realm 
of regional feeling and personal arobition. The original 
1961 coalition was based to a great extent on fears the 
down-state legislators had of being dominated by urban and 
up.-state legislators. Ambition was probably the most 
likely reason for the 1971 coalition which elected Senator 
Burns as Senate Pr.esident. Regardless, full considera­
tion of the subject deserves a separate and extensive wo·rk. 
23 This type of observation is impossible to document 
because it was obtained through off-the-record interviews. 
It is relevant to the actual event and, in the author's 
judgment, reliable. 
CHAPTER V . 
-AREAS OF INQUIRY 
There were six areas of inquiry relating to partisan 
voting in the Oregon Legislature.~ These were: the two 
major parties themselves, urban legislators,. women legis­
la"t:ors, legislators under 30-., freshmen legislators and 
legislators representing single member districts • 
.. Each of these areas or topics has a ce~tain'amount of 
the previously mentioned folk wisdom about it. For in­
stance, Republicans are usually thought ~o be more partisan 
than Democrats; there is, supposedly, less dissension in 
the Republican party. Do the results of this study confirm 
or deny such political folk wisdom? 
.. . 
The Two M.ajor .~ Parties 
As st?ted above, Republicans are supposed to be more 
partisan than Democrats. This was tha case in three out of 
four instances which were examined. In only one instance 
were the Democrats more cohes~ve'than the Republicans; this 
was in the 56th Session of the House when the Democrats had 
a partisan score of 77%. For the Senate in the 56th Session, 
the Republicans "tv-ere more cohesive, 80% to 72%. The Repub­
licans were more cohesive in the House in the 57th Session, 
75% to 72%. The Republicans were more cohesive in the 
Senate, 76% to 74%. Some of the differences in percentages 
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are slight. These are 'not samples', however, but measure­

ments of actual population behavior, and therefore, a 

valid descripti'on of the actual events. 

TABLE IX 

COMPARISON OF COHESION OF THE TWO ,PARTIES OVER THE 

TWO SESSIONS IN BO~H HOUSES 

Senate Senate .House House 

56th 57th 56th 5.7th 

Democrats 72% 74% 84% 72% 

Republicans 80%* 76% 77%* 75% 

Dem ~1aj Dem Maj Rep tlaj Dem ~·1aj 

(*Difference of means significant to 5% level.) 

One fact did emerge, however; the minority party was 
more cohesive than the majority party in all four cases. 
(If the fourteen regular Senate Democrats are cons~dered 
the "minority" in the 56th Session, they, to?, were more 
cohesive than the "majority" coalition, 82% to 79%.) Whether 
this is due to size or other factors is hard to determine. 
lIt is very possible'that the minority party perceives it­
self as a minority party and feels a special necessity to 
vote as a whole. Several legislators were interviewed in 
reference to this point. They agreed with the basic pre­
mis'e and pointed out that many of the freshmen Democratic 
legislators who had low partisan scores had never been part 
of a minority and did not know what it was like. This 
would.be an appropriate topic for further research. 
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Urban Legislators 
Comparing urban legislators to nonurban legislators 
is highly appropriate for the Oregon Legislature. Sec­
tional interests playa very important role in some deci-­
sions. For example, support for mass transit is rather 
difficult to find among down-state legislators. 
Oregon has in its demographic' spectrum areas which 
are densely urban as well as those which are extremely 
rural. Urban legislators were ,among the g~oups examined 
in the previously mentioned studies. A comparison of re­
sults is appropriate. 
An urban legislator is defined as one 'who represents 
a portion of any city with a population of 80,000 or more. 
~is -e£fectiy~ly confines consideration, to' the Portland 
and Eugene areas. It is more useful to have an objective, 
exclusive definition of what is urban than a more subjec­
tive, inclusive definition. An exclusive defin~tion of' 
urban will give "pure 1f or unadulterated population to 
measure. If an inclusive definition is used, the partisan­
ship of more than urban legislators would be measured. The 
interest is. in urban legislators per se and not in legis­
lators from partially urban areas, rural areas, or suburban 
areas. At the same time, an objective standard is needed. 
The peculiari'ties of leg'islative boundaries 'and' the fact 
that all districts have approximately the same population 
makes any other definition un\vorkable. Even using the 
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80,000 population figure, one representative and one sena­
tor who represented both 'urban and rural areas were in­
cl~ded. Representative Glenn Otto and Senator Vern Cook 
have large rural areas in their districts, a~ well as part 
of Portland. Other possible definitions would have only 
compounded this problem. Gr.umm had a similar problem in 
his work with the Kansas Legislature. He notes that the 
use of the usual census definition of urban is inappro­
priate. 24 Grumm eventually used his own definition of 
urban for his study of the Kansas Legislature. He placed 
the ,urban areas in rank order and ran correlations be­
tween those areas and the voting patterns of the various 
~egislators in reference to certain types of legislation. 
As s~t 'forth in Table X, urban senate Democrats had an' 
average partisan score of 78%, as opposed to 74% for, all 
senate Democrats. The one senate Republican who could 
be classified as urban, Senator Wingard, had a partisan 
score of only 47%, as opposed to 75~ for the senate Repub­
licans as a whole. Senator Wingard voted with the Demo­
crats on party votes more than he voted with his own 
Republican party_ As mentioned before, Wingard was elected 
from a heavily Democratic district in Eugene. About 18% 
of the party votes on which Wingard dissented involved 
labor issues. This was one of the few instances in which 
a particular type of issue stood out. 
24 Grumm",p. 348. 
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In the "House, the "urban Democrats had an average 
partisan score of 79%, as opposed to 72% for all the Demo­
crats. Urban Republican representatives were significantly 
less partisan than Republicans as a whole. ~he average 
partisan score of urban Republicans was 51% as compared to 
75% for Republicans as a whole. The urban Republicans 
voted wit4 the Democrats almost half the time on party 
votes. 
" . 
All of these findings seem to confirm the popular 
folk wisdom that urban legislators are more "liberal" than 
legislators as a whole. Of course, one has to make the 
association between liberal and Democratic. This is not an 
untenable proposition and is necessary if some of the 
popular conceptions about Oregon politics ~re to pe tested. 
Gr~ found a very high correlation between liberal and 
Democratic in his study.25 
25 Grumm, p. 351. 
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TABLE X' 
INDICES OF PARTISANSHIP FOR URBAN 
IN THE 57TH SESSION 
Republicans 
Wingard 
Mean 
Mean for all Ris 
Median 
Republicans 
BurrOv.7s 
Elliot 
Kinsey 
Rieke 
Whitehead 
Mean 
Mean for all Rls 
Median 
SENATE 
47% 
41% 
76% 
47% 
,HOUSE 
54% 
50% 
49% 
38% 
66% 
51% 
75% 
50% 
LEGISLATORS 
Democrats 
Burns J. 

Burns K. 

Cook. 

Fadeley E. 

Hallock 

Ho,,'lard 

Hahoney 

Roberts B. 

stevenson v.7. 

Mean 
Mean'for all D's 
.Median 
Democrats 
Akeson 

Blumenauer 

_	Cherry· 

Kafoury 

Katz 

Lang 

McCoy 

Otto 

Peck 

Perry 

Priestley 

Roberts M. 

. Mean 
53% 
84% 
80% 
79% 
80% 
80% 
67% 
85% 
91% 
78% 
74% 
80% 
75% 
81% 

69% 

88% 
.85% 
78% 
93% 

63% 

67% 
81% 
78% 
86% 
79%* 
Mean for allots 72% 
Median 78% . 
(*Diffe·rence of mean significant as a sample at the 5% level.) 
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Women 	 Legislators 
There were eleven women in the Oregon Legislature in 
~ 
the 57th Session. Nine were in the House and two were in 
the Sena-te. iThe 'popular conception of women, in Oregon po~i­
tics is that they are more liberal. Examining their parti­
san scores in Table XI seems to confirm this. 
The two women in the Senate were both Democrats. 
Thei~ -average partisan score was 83.5% as compared '-to 74% 
for Democrats as a whole.- Democratic Homen in 'the House 
were also more partisan, 85% as compared to 72% for Demo­
crats as a whole. Republican women in the House were 
26% less partisan than Republicans as a whole; they had 
an average partisan score of 49% as opposed to 75% for 
; 	 Republicans as a whole. It should also be noted that six 
.' 
out of the eleven women were classified as urban 
legiSlators. 
TABLE XI 

PARTISANSHIP OF WOMEN LEGISLATORS 

FOR THE 57TH ~ESSION 

SENATE 
Democrats 
Browne 	 82% 
Roberts B. 	 85% 
Mean 	 83.5% 
Mean for all D's 74% 
Median 	 83.5% 
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HOUSE 

Democrats Republicans 
Dereli 81% Burrows 54% 
-Fadeley N. 95% , Paulus 56% 
Katz 85% Rieke 38%_ 
Peck 67% 
Roberts M. 86% Mean 49%* 

lihiting 93% 

Mean for all Rls 75% 

Me.an 85%* 

Median 54% 

Mean for all D's 72% 

~ledian 85.5% 
(*Difference of means signifiQant as a sample at 5% level.) 
Legislators Under Thirty 
There were eleven legislators under the age of 
thirty in the 57th Session; they were all representatives. 
YoUng office holders are,also suppc;>sed to be more "lib­
eral." If the neces'sary association bet\veen Dernocratic and 
liberal can again be made, we can see py examining 
Table XII that the opposite was true in the 57th Session. 
The Democratic legislators under thirty 'tvere less 
partisan than Democrats as a.whole. They had an average 
partisan score of 61%, as opposed to 72%. Young Republi­
can legislators were more partisan than Republicans as a 
whole, 84% to 75%. 
The average figure of 61% for the young Democrats 
is deceptive because it reflects the voting.of Gilmour, 
Magruder and C. Wolfer to a great extent. The median of 
this group is 83%. The median gives information as to the 
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nature of data and is that score which 'falls in the mid­
dle if all the scores are arranged in order of magnitude. 
The median in this case shows us that while the group, 
as a group, performed in a certain way, the majority of its 
members performed in another. The difference between the 
meqian of 83% 'and the mean of 61% only further illus­
trates how extreme was the behavior of these three young 
Democrats. 
The lowest partisan sC9r~ for any legislator during. 
the two sessions studied was made by Magruder. He voted 
with his own party only 12% of the time. He comes from ~:-
a heavily Democratic district and was unopposed in ~~e 
,last general election. Magruder appears to be an excep­
tion to any general rule of constituency..influence.' ,His 
performance is very contrary to MacRae's'finding that' 
party regulars tend to come 'from safe districts. This 
only further illustrates the risk of generalizing about 
something which is an extremely complex phenomenon. 
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TABLE XII 
PARTISANSHIP OF LEGISLATORS UNDER 30 YEARS OF AGE 

FOR THE 57TH SESSION 

Democrats Republicans 

AuCoin 91% Bunn 79% 

Blumenauer 81% Johnson L. 86% 

Densmore 87% .St.ults D. 86% 

Gilmour 19% 

Magruder 12% Mean 84%* 

Marx 80% 

Roberts M. 86% Mean for all Rig 75% 

Wolfer C. 35% ", 

Median 86% 
Mean 61%* 
Mean for all D's 72% 
Median 83% 
(*Difference in mean significant as a sample to 5% level... ) 
Fr~shmen Legislators 
There were twenty-six freshmen legislators in the 
House in the 57th Session. There '(vere no frE?shmen in the I. 
Senate. The indices of· partisanship are set forth in 
Table XIII. Freshmen Democrats had an average partisan 
score of 74% versus'72% for Democrats as a whole. Fresh­
men Republicans had an average partisan score of 79%, 'as 
opposed to 75% for Republicans as a whole. 
The only notable difference between freshmen and 
legislators as a whole was found between the Republicans 
and the freshmen Republicans. Freshmen were also sup­
posed to be more liberal than veteran legislators. This 
aid not prove to be true. 
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TABLE ,XIII 
PARTISANSHIP OF FRESHMEN LEGISLATORS 

FOR THE 57TH SESSION 

Democrats Republicans 
Blumenauer 81% Bunn 79% 
Dereli 81% Burro'tV's 54% 
Gilmour 19% Hampton 77% 
Grannell 85% - Jones '91 % 
Groener 83% Morris 86% 
Kafoury 88% Oakes 84% 
Katz 85% Stults'D. 88% 
Lindquist 88% Whitehead 66% 
Marx 80% Wilhelms 85% 
McCoy 93%' 
Otto '63% Mean 79%*. 
Roberts M. 85% 
Stevenson E. 76% Mean for all Rls 75% 

Whallon 65% 

Whiting 93% Median 85% 

Wolfer c. 45% 
Mean 74%* 
Mean for all D's 72% 
Median 82% 
(*Difference in means as a sample significant to 5% lev~l.) 
Change in Partisanship Due to Election From Single Member 
~Districts , 
" 
Multimember districts were eliminated in the 1971 
redistricting. The supposed effect of L~is was to increase 
the influence of constituencies upon the legislators. 
Each legislator would have an identifiable district and 
constituency due to the redistri~ting. Table XIV com­
pares the average partisan scores of legislators elected 
from multimember districts in the 56th Session with·the 
average partisan scores of the same legislators elected 
from single member districts in the 57th Session. 
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The greatest significant change 'seems to be in the 
partisanship of the three House Republicans who were 
elected from multime~her districts in the 56th Session 
and from single member districts in the 57th Session.' Tn~y 
had an average' partisan score of 56% in the 56th Session and 
49% in the 57th Session. ALI three of these Republican rep­
resentatives were from the Portland area. They were elected 
from d'istricts ~lith Democratic majorities. This would seem 
to indicate that constituency influen~e did increase with 
election from single member districts. 
Comparisons between other groups of legislators 
I 'reveals no significant change.
I
I TABLE XIV 
t 
-COl·1PARISQN OF PARTISANSHIP OF LEGISLATORS'­
t REPRESENTING' r'1ULTIMENIBER DISTRICTS 
I 
I 

! 
I 
IN THE 56TH SESSION AND SINGLE 

MEr.ffiER DISTRICTS IN THE 
57TH SESSION 
I 
I Republicans 
Carson 
Eivers 
Wingard 
Mean 
Median 
SENATE 
- 56th Session 
70% 
76% 
55% 
67% 
70% 
ReEublicans 
Carson 
Eivers 
Wingard 
Mean 
Median 
- 57th Session 
-70% 
74% 
64% 
64% 
70% 
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Democrats 56th Se'ss'ion ' Damb'crat's' , '-' , '57th Se'ssi,on 
BrOvlne 84% Browne 82% 
Burbidge 92% Burbidge 90% 
Cook* 84% Cook 80% 
Fadeley E. 80% Fadeley E. 79% 
Groener 72% Groener 80%. 
lJIahoney* 72% Mahoney 67% 
Roberts B. 82% Roberts B. 85% 
:Mean 80% Mean 81% 
Median 82% Median 80% 
*Senators who ran in 1972 
HOUSE 
ReEublicans 
-
56th Session Republicans - 57th Session ..'t-
Elliot 41% Elliot 50% 

Kinsey 64% Kinsey 49% ~~ ~; ~ 

Rieke 61% Rieke 38% 

!olean 56%* Mean 49%* ..­
Median' 61% Median 49% 
.....Democrats - '56th Session Democrats 57th Session 
Akeson 86% Akeson 75% 
AuCoin 81% AuCoin 91% ~" 
.!.,.. 
Eymann 97% Eymann' 87% 
~~.Fadeley N. 95% Fadeley N. 95% 
~ 
Lang 67% Lang 78% .... J:. ... .. 
Peck 80% Peck 67% 
Skelton 89% Skelton 67% 
Willits 85% Willits 75% 
Mean 82% - Mean 79% 
Median 85.'5% ~,1edian 76.5% 
*Difference of means significant as sample to 5% 'level. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
Several conclusions can be made about partisanship 

and roll call voting in the Oregon Legislature. 

1. Few of the many issues become partisan. This 
partly reflects the complexity of the legislative process, 
which tends to resolve conflicts before measures reach 
the floor. It also reflects the fact that other factors 
and attitudes besides parti~a~ship are involved in deter­
,mining how legislators vote. 
2. The minority party does tend to be more cohesive. 
The 'folk wisdom of Oregon politics was that the Repub­
licans are more cohesive. Although this was the case in 
three out of the four instances examined, a generalization 
would be unjustified. 
3. Urban Republicans' tend to vote with Democrats. 
This finding confirms the folk wisdom about urban Republi~­
cans. It should be noted, however, that' in many instances 
the defections of the urban Republicans only serve to 
balance the defection of some of the less partisan Demo­
crats. This again illustrates that party is only one 
factor in the process. 
4. Young legislators tend'to be more partisan if 
they are Republicans and less partisan if they are Demo­
crats, As mentioned earlier, this denies the popular 
conception,of young elected officials being more liberal. 
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As a group, young Democrats reduced the overall cohesive­
ness of the party as a whole. Although this was the 
result of the voting patterns of only three out of the 
'eight young Democrats, the conclusion must be accepted 
because it reflects the actual behavior of the population 
considered. 
5. Women tend to be less partisan if they are Re­
.publicans and more partisan if they are Democrats. This 
confirms the political foik wisdom 'of women being more 
liberal. 
6. Election from single member districts -seems to 
affeot the partisanship of urban Republicans: they be­
come less partisan. The· folk wisdom states that single 
member districting would make legislators ~ore receptive 
to consti tuency demand.. The findings support this view,. .-::-~ 
but only in a limited sense. The examination was made 
over a two-session period and a change in party control. 
Most of the conclusions found in this study were 

consistent with the previously mentioned works by Gr~~ 

and MacRae. Grumm found that R~publicans elected from 

urban Democratic areas tended to vote with the Democrats. 

'MacRae found the same effect. He alsQ found the re­
verse was true, Democrats electecl·froro Republican dis­
tricts tended to vote with the Republicans. In Oregon, 
there are no Democratic legislators elected from dis­
.tricts with. Republican majorities. 
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It is especially hard to separate -the 'roles of ur­
banization and dominant Democratic registration. As stated 
earlier, Republicans elected from such districts tend to 
vote with the Democrats. The problem is on~ of multiple 
cause. Do they vote a particular way because they are 
defending urban interests or because they perceive their 
constituency as being Democratic? As stated earlier, the 
change in partisanship for those urban Republicans' be­
tween the 56th and 57th Sessions-would suggest the latter. ", 
The topic is complex and deserves further research which 
would take into account other factors such as the influ­
ence of the legislative leadership and ~~e types of 
legislation considered. ' 
As was mentioned in Chapter III, three of the areas 
of. interest were not constituency related--women legis­
lators, young legislators and freshmen legislators. Two 
of these factors, sex and youth, proved to be significant. 
Women were atypical in both parties in relation to par­
tisanship. Young Democrats were also atypical. 
A possible explanation o~ the behavior of some of 
the young Democrats may be constituency'related. The 
three young representatives who had extremely low partisan 
scores 'vere all from nonurban d:Lstricts. There may have 
been other factors involved. The motivation of legis­
lators under thirty-would merit further investigation. 
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'In reference to women, the situation is rather com­
plex~ It was noted that there is a high correlation 
between election as a woman and election from an urban 
district. This is only one of several possibilities. 
One possible area of invest~gatiQn m~ght be to find some 
commonality in how women in Oregon become involved in 
politics. A second possibility might be that women are 
the only major group in Oregon politics which has what 
could be called a uminorityU constituency. Do women 
legislators perceive a special con~ern because they are 
women? One measure which was sponsored only by the 
eleven women legislators did not undergo a party vote in 
either the House or the Senate. SB 148, which is now law, 
m~de men equally as guilty of prostitution for offering to 
pay for such services. 
Regardless, the question of co~stituency influence 
on legislators, or even influence per ~ is extremely 
intricate. The point is best made by Wayne Shannon in 
his discussion of constituency and its relation to voting 
patterns. 
Therefore, although it would serve the purpose of 
neatness and theoretical nicety to be able to argue 
that constituency differences account for intra­
party voting differences, evidence from the stUdies 
of Turner, MacRae, Forman, and the present author 
indicate only some relationship at some times be­
tween constituency characteristics and intraparty 
differences. 26 
26 Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituenc and Con 
Voting (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Unlversi~y 
p. 155. 
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Finally, partisanship will continue to playa role 

in the struggle for control of the Oregon Le'gislature. 

lThe degree of partisanship of the two parties engaged in 
that struggle will, to a large degree, dete~ne whiqh 
will prevail. Partisanship, or cohesion, will be espe­
cially important to any majority party which holds only a 
small edge. The threat of coalition will be in inverse 
prbporti9n to the partisansnip of such a majority, for 
the minority party partisanship will also remain an impor­
tant ingredient. A minority party with a high degree of 
cohesion may, in many instances, exert influence far be­
yon~ its actual ,size. 
The legislative process is as complicated and di­
verse as the society for which it seeks t~ enact laws.' 
It is only hoped that this study has shed some light on 
that process. 
..~ .. "­
"\1< ••.: ­
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